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 Consumer Response to Cigarette Excise Tax Changes
Lesley Chiou Erich Muehlegger ∗
May 19, 2010
Abstract
We use a rich dataset of weekly cigarette sales to examine how consumers adapt their behav-
ior before and after excise tax increases - whether by reducing demand, stockpiling, traveling to
low-tax jurisdictions, or substituting towards lower-cost brands. Consumer response varies sub-
stantially for diﬀerent types of cigarettes. Stockpiling primarily occurs for discount cigarettes
and is most pronounced at stores far from lower-tax jurisdictions. Border-crossing is greatest at
stores close to low-tax jurisdictions and occurs primarily for cigarettes sold by the carton. Fi-
nally, we ﬁnd modest short-run substitution towards lower-cost brands following a tax-increase,
consistent with consumers smoothing the transition to higher cigarette taxes. These diﬀerences
in consumer behavior lead to meaningful diﬀerences in tax incidence - pass-through is higher
for discount cigarettes which have more inelastic demand. Pass-through is lower near low-tax
borders, especially for cigarettes sold by the carton for which cross-border evasion is greatest.
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11 Introduction
Many taxes, from cigarette taxes to proposed carbon taxes, are motivated by non-ﬁscal consid-
erations. While a great number of studies estimate short and long-run tax elasticities, fewer are
able to examine how consumers adapt their behavior to tax changes. Although the tax elasticity
of demand is useful for ﬁscal considerations, it provides an incomplete picture of whether the
observed consumer response represents an actual reduction in consumption of the taxed good
or whether it represents some form of consumer tax avoidance or behavior change. In this
paper, we study how consumers respond to cigarette excise tax increases by examining weekly
sales of cigarettes at approximately 85 supermarkets in the Chicago metropolitan area between
1989 and 1996. Our micro-data allows us to closely investigate the diﬀerent margins by which
consumers may respond to a tax change. In particular, we can distinguish and empirically test
four diﬀerent margins by which consumers respond to rising taxes: (1) reducing consumption,
(2) stockpiling the good prior to the tax change, (3) substituting from high-price premium to
low-price discount versions of the good, and (4) shifting purchases from high-tax jurisdictions
to lower-tax jurisdictions. Our study is unique in that we are able to examine both short-
and long-run adaptation to tax changes over time with micro-data. As consumers can mitigate
the eﬀects of a rising tax on their consumption by stockpiling, substitution across brands, and
shifting the location of their purchases, our work has important implications for non-ﬁscal tax
eﬃcacy, especially for “sin” taxes designed to discourage consumption.
Our empirical strategy overcomes three challenges commonly faced in distinguishing how
smokers adapt behavior in response to tax changes. First, data on consumer purchases are
rarely reported frequently enough to identify stockpiling from idiosyncratic changes in tastes.
Second, few datasets distinguish between diﬀerent quality-tiers of a taxed good. Aggregation
across diﬀerent quality-tiers obscures the identiﬁcation of consumer substitution from high-price
to low-price brands which may occur following a tax increase. Finally, few studies track sales at
a highly disaggregated geographic level; most of the previous cigarette literature uses indirect
estimates of border-crossing from high-tax to low-tax counties or states.
We are able to overcome these challenges by using a dataset which reports weekly sales at the
Universal Product Code (UPC) level at individual supermarkets in the Chicago area. We observe
sales with high frequency, allowing us to examine the intertemporal pattern of sales around
state and local cigarette tax changes. Furthermore, we observe prices and quantities of each
particular UPC sold (e.g., Marlboro 120s, sold in individual soft packs) at each store. The UPC-
level data distinguishes sales of single-packs from cartons as well as sales of diﬀerent cigarette
2quality-tiers, which allows us to investigate and estimate substitution between these categories
following a tax change. Finally, the supermarkets that we observe are located throughout the
Chicago metropolitan area and vary demographically as well as in proximity to the Indiana and
Wisconsin borders. Thus, we are able to observe how consumers near or far from lower-tax
borders respond as taxes rise. We also examine whether consumer response is correlated with
customer demographics - for instance, wealthy smokers may more easily absorb a tax increase
without switching to cheaper, discount brands.
To motivate our empirical analysis, we ﬁrst use an event study to examine a change in the
Illinois tax in July 1993that increased the state cigarette tax by approximately 46% from 30 to 44
cents per pack. We use this discrete change in cigarette taxes to closely examine how consumers
shift their behavior during the short-run prior to and in the aftermath of this large tax change
- whether by stockpiling cigarettes in anticipation of the tax increase or by changing the type,
quantity, and/or location of cigarettes purchased afterwards. We ﬁnd evidence that consumers
do anticipate tax increases by stockpiling in the months prior to the tax increase and that this
behavior diﬀers markedly by quality-tier and location. While we do not observe stockpiling of
premium cigarettes, we observe a dramatic increase (>200%) in the sales of discount cigarettes in
the month prior to the tax change. Moreover, stockpiling is more pronounced at stores located
far from the borders of Indiana and Wisconsin, where the costs of traveling to a lower-tax
jurisdiction are greater.
We extend the analysis by constructing a longer panel over the period 1989 to 1996, which
includes two federal tax increases in January 1991 and January 1993, the July 1993 state tax
increase in Illinois, local cigarette tax increases in Cook County, the municipalities of Chicago
and Evanston, and tax increases the neighboring states of Wisconsin and Indiana. The longer
panel allows us to better test for stockpiling as well as other long-run methods of adaptation, such
as switching from more expensive to less expensive cigarette brands or crossing to neighboring
jurisdictions with lower tax rates. Our estimates imply that a one-cent increase in cigarette
prices is associated with approximately a four percent increase in the sales of discount cigarettes
during the month preceding the tax increase. Similarly to our event study results, we ﬁnd that
stockpiling of discounted cigarettes is greater at stores far from the Indiana border. We do not
ﬁnd strong evidence that stockpiling is correlated with store demographics - we only ﬁnd that
stockpiling is negatively correlated with a store’s proportion of minority customers.
We ﬁnd suggestive evidence that consumers shift between cigarette quality-tiers as taxes
rise. The model we present in section 2 suggests that, absent addiction, consumers will tend to
3shift towards more expensive brands as per-unit excise taxes rise and the relative prices between
diﬀerent quality tiers declines. Over the long term, our panel analysis ﬁnds evidence consistent
with this prediction. For most locations, tax increases are associated with a shift towards
higher quality cigarettes in the long-run. This eﬀect declines as the percentage of customers
who are minority or over 60 years of age increases; these customers may permanently substitute
away from premium brands in favor of cheaper discount cigarettes. In the short-run, though,
discount cigarette sales rise after a tax increase, even after controlling for cigarette prices. This
is consistent with a basic model of addiction - consumers may shift in the short-run to lower
quality cigarettes in order to smooth the transition to higher cigarette prices.
Finally, we ﬁnd that border-proximity and strength of the incentive to travel to lower tax
jurisdictions is associated with a reduction in cigarettes sales. The reduction in sales occurs
only for cigarettes sold by the carton - exactly the class of products for which we would expect
border-crossing to be the greatest. We estimate that sales of cigarettes sold by the carton are
approximately forty-four percent lower at a store ﬁve miles from the Indiana border facing the
average tax diﬀerential during the period (24 cents per pack) than a store of average distance
from the Indiana border (∼ 27 miles). We do not ﬁnd a similar eﬀect for cigarettes sold by the
pack.
These diﬀerences in consumer response translate into meaningful diﬀerences in tax incidence.
We ﬁnd that pass-through is greater for discount cigarettes, for which we estimate the demand
to be most price inelastic, than for premium brands. We also ﬁnd that tax pass-through is lower
for cigarettes sold by the carton. In a similar fashion to Doyle and Samphantharak (2008),
we also ﬁnd that pass-through declines near low-tax borders, where the elasticity of demand is
likely to be greater. This eﬀect is especially pronounced for cigarettes sold by the carton - the
class of cigarettes for which we estimate border-crossing to be the greatest.
In addition to contributing the literature on smoker response to cigarette taxes (e.g., Coats
(1995), Yurekli and Zhang (2000), Adda and Cornaglia (2006)), our paper informs the growing
literature examining short-run consumer response to taxes. In the durable goods context, Sallee
(2008) examines the intertemporal response of consumers’ automobile purchases, exploiting the
January 2005 increase in value of federal hybrid vehicle incentives. Sallee ﬁnds a signiﬁcant
delay in purchases of hybrid vehicle at the end of 2004, consistent with consumer anticipation
of the increase in the value of the hybrid vehicle incentive. In contrast, we examine non-durable
good purchases - for which stockpiling is possible and substitution between high- and low-quality
versions of a taxed good likely diﬀer. Our paper also relates to the literature on border-crossing
4behavior due to diﬀerences in taxes across jurisdictions (Stehr (2007); Lovenheim (2008); Chiou
and Muehlegger (2009)).
In section 2, we present a stylized model of cigarette consumption which we use to motivate
our empirical predictions. In section 3, we present our data. Section 4 discusses the results of
our two empirical approaches. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
To motivate our empirical analysis and our discussion of how smokers may adapt their behavior
to tax changes, we consider a stylized two-period game in which smokers choose between two
classes of cigarettes: a “premium” brand sold at price pb and a “discount” brand sold at price pd.
Smokers consume cigarettes in both periods and can also stockpile cigarettes in the ﬁrst period
in anticipation of a per-pack tax increase t. Denoting consumption of premium and discount
cigarettes in periods 1 and 2 as q1b, q2b, q1d, and q2d, consumption of the outside good as z1
and z2, and stockpiling of premium and discount cigarettes in period 1 as xb and xd, consumers
maximize
U(q1b,q2b,q1d,q2d,z1,z2) = αf(q1b + γq1d) + g(z1) + δ[αf(q2b + xb + γq2d + γxd) + g(z2)]
−δβh(q1b + q1d − (q2b + xb + q2d + xd))] (1)
subject to non-negativity constraints and budget constraints
pb(q1b + xb) + pd(q1d + xd) + z1 = B (2)
(pb + t)q2b + (pd + t)q2d + z2 = B.
The function f denotes utility derived from cigarette consumption, and the function g denotes
denotes utility derived from non-smoking consumption. In addition, we include a function h,
which captures the addiction disutility associated with reducing consumption in the post-tax
period. We assume that f and g are increasing and concave and that h is increasing and convex.
Consumers are heterogeneous with α representing consumer preference for smoking, γ denoting
heterogeneous consumer preference for discount cigarettes, and β denoting the degree to which
consumers incur disutility from reducing their cigarette consumption. We deﬁne δ < 1 as the
rate at which a consumer discounts future consumption.
By construction, a consumer will have an exclusive preference for premium or discount
5cigarettes depending on their value of gamma. We use ˆ γ1, ˆ γ2 and ˆ γx to denote the unique
threshold values at which a consumer is indiﬀerent between purchasing discount and premium
cigarettes in period 1, period 2, and as inventories between the low-tax and high-tax periods. A
consumer with value of γ above a threshold (i.e., a greater preference for discount cigarettes) will
purchase discount cigarettes exclusively, while a consumer with a value of γ below the threshold
will exclusively purchase premium cigarettes.
ˆ γ1 =
βh′[pb − pd]
αf′(pb)
+
pd
pb
(3)
ˆ γ2 =
−βh′[pb − pd]
αf′(pb + t)
+
pd + t
pb + t
(4)
ˆ γx =
−βh′[pb − pd]
αf′(pb)
+
pd
pb
(5)
Absent addiction (where β = 0), the threshold value of γ depends exclusively on the relative
prices of discount and premium cigarettes. Consequently, as per-pack taxes rise, the threshold
shifts in favor of premium cigarettes.1 With addiction, a forward-looking consumer will shift,
on the margin, towards premium cigarettes in the ﬁrst period, recognizing that smoking fewer
cigarettes reduces the disutility of lowering consumption when taxes rise. On the other hand,
addiction shifts consumers towards stockpiling discount cigarettes. In addition, in the post-tax
period, addiction shifts consumers on the margin towards discount cigarettes in the short-run, at
least until the smoker is able to wean themselves to a lower level of consumption in the long-run.
Conditional on α and β, the thresholds deﬁne four classes of smokers: (1) individuals who
only smoke or stockpile premium cigarettes, (2) individuals who stockpile discount cigarettes,
but purchase premium cigarettes for immediate consumption, (3) individuals who stockpile
discount cigarettes, and purchase discount cigarettes for consumption in one but not both of
the pre-tax and post-tax period, and (4) individuals who only smoke or stockpile discount
cigarettes.2 As the disutility associated with reducing cigarette consumption rises, the threshold
value of ˆ γx falls, and we would expect that consumers would stockpile discount cigarettes. In
addition, ˆ γ1 declines relative to ˆ γ2, implying some consumers may switch from premium to
discount cigarettes in the post-tax period to smooth their reduction in cigarette consumption.
Although the tax does not aﬀect the proportion of consumers who stockpile premium and
discount cigarettes, the tax does aﬀect the amount of cigarettes a consumer chooses to stock-
1This implicitly assumes that tax pass-through for the discount and premium cigarettes is equivalent - a hypothesis
we are able to test empirically.
2Whether group (3) are individuals who smoke premium cigarettes pre-tax and discount cigarettes post-tax or vice
versa depends on the functional form of f and h. These consumers will switch from premium to discount cigarettes
when ˆ γ1 > ˆ γ2 ⇐⇒
βh′(pb−pd)
αf′(pb) +
βh′(pb−pd)
αf′(pb+t) >
pd+t
pb+t −
pd
pb .
6pile.3 Depending on how γ compares to ˆ γ1, ˆ γ2 and ˆ γx, consumers purchase premium or discount
cigarettes exclusively in period 1, period 2, or as inventories, and three of the nonnegativity con-
straints will bind. The ﬁrst-order conditions are standard and imply the usual three equalities.
As an example, for a smoker who only chooses to smoke or stockpile premium cigarettes (with
a value of γ <
−βh
′[pb−pd]
αf′pb +
pd
pb ), the three equalities
αf′(q1b) − δβh′(q1b − q2b − xb)
pb
= g
′(z1) (6)
αf′(q2b + xb) + βh′(q1b − q2b − xb)
pb + t
= g
′(z2) (7)
δαf′(q2b + xb) + δβh′(q1b − q2b − xb)
pb
= g′(z1) (8)
equate the marginal utility per dollar of cigarette and non-cigarette consumption in the ﬁrst
period, the second period, and intertemporally through the inventory constraint. In all cases, the
comparative statics are consistent with intuition. The imposition of taxes increases inventories
while reducing both classes of consumption in the ﬁrst period.
3 Empirical Model and Data
Our empirical analysis relies on scanner data of cigarette sales from Dominick’s Finer Foods
(hereafter, DFF) provided by the Kitts Center for Marketing at Chicago GSB.4 Dominick’s Finer
Foods is the second largest supermarket chain in the Chicago metropolitan area with a market
share of approximately 25 percent (Chevalier et al., 2003). The DFF scanner dataset provides
weekly, UPC-level data for twenty classes of products, from orange juice to pain medication to
laundry detergent at 120 DFF grocery stores in Lake, Cook, Dupage and Will Counties, from
1989 to 1996. For our purposes, we focus speciﬁcally on the scanner data related to cigarettes
for which per pack taxes were raised at various points by the state of Illinois, Cook County, and
neighboring jurisdictions. The DFF data track cigarette sales at approximately 83 of the stores.
For each cigarette UPC with positive sales in a particular store-week, the scanner data reports
the total number of units sold (reported in packs for UPCs corresponding to products sold by
the pack and reported in cartons for products sold by the carton). In addition, the scanner data
reports the retail price for each UPC with positive sales.5 Because the DFF scanner data only
3Although we do not formally present it, for sake of brevity, the model extends in a relatively straightforward
fashion to one in which consumers have an additional option of traveling to a lower cost jurisdiction. In this case,
the value to stockpiling is lower, especially for consumers who can travel to the low-tax jurisdiction at low cost.
4The DFF data is publicly available at http://research.chicagogsb.edu/marketing/databases/dominicks/index.aspx.
5As excise taxes are remitted by wholesalers, the store will not likely observe the pre-tax price for cigarettes.
7reports quantities and prices for products oﬀered by Philip Morris for a subset of the time period,
we restrict our analysis to sales of cigarettes produced by the three other major manufacturers:
Lorriard, Liggett, and R J Reynolds. For our three manufacturers, we observe positive sales for
348 distinct UPC codes. Approximately 34 percent of UPCs have positive sales in any particular
week. In total, we observe sales of 13.2 million packs of cigarettes in our sample.6
We categorize UPCs into “premium” and “discount” products based on the observed retail
prices. For each UPC with recorded sales, we normalize the retail price by the unweighted
average price of all the cigarettes sold in the same store and week. The normalized retail price
quantiﬁes the markup (or discount) at which a particular UPC is priced relative to the average
per pack cigarette price in a particular store and week. We then average the weekly, store-
speciﬁc ratios for each UPC across stores and over time to calculate how much, on average, a
product’s posted price is discounted relative to other brands. That is, if J denotes the set of
store-week observations, and UPC i has positive sales in the subset Ji ⊆ J, consisting of ni
store-weeks, we construct our proxy as
RelPricei =
P
j∈Ji pij/pj
ni
, (9)
where pij denotes UPC i’s per-pack price in store-week j, and pj denotes the sales-weighted
average per-pack price for cigarettes sold by the pack (or by the carton if UPC i represents
carton-level sales).
We ﬁnd that top of the cigarettes price distribution tends to be closely clustered. Prices for
the most expensive half of UPCs are within two to three percent of each other. Other UPCs
are sold at varying levels of discount. We classify UPCs that sell at a ten-percent or greater
discount on average as “discount” cigarettes. The lowest decile of cigarettes (partially comprised
by the brands Doral, Winston, and Magna) are priced at a 13 and 16 percent discount relative
to the majority of the per pack prices. As a point of comparison, the least expensive UPCs in
our sample sell at 25 percent discounts on average. Products we classify as “discount” based on
the average relative prices correspond well to binary industry classiﬁcations of “premium” and
“discount” cigarettes.
We collected data on excises taxes levied by the federal government, Illinois, and neighboring
states from the Tax Burden on Tobacco. We obtained information on county and municipal
Average prices of cigarettes in our sample are similar to ﬁgures reported for tax-inclusive prices in the Tax Burden
of Tobacco (2007).
6Cigarettes sales by R. J. Reynolds, Lorillard, and Liggett total 8.4 million packs, 4.2 million packs, and 0.6 million
packs respectively.
8excises taxes from city ordinances online and from speaking with local government oﬃcials.7
Federal taxes increased at two points in our sample. On January 1, 1991, the federal excise tax
increased from 16 to 20 cents per pack, and on January 1, 1993, the federal excise tax increased
again to 24 cents per pack. State excise taxes increased during the period as well. Illinois
raised its state cigarette tax from 30 to 44 cents per pack in July 1993 (week 200 in Figure 1).
The excise tax in Indiana remained constant at 15.5 cents per pack while the tax in Wisconsin
increased from 30 to 38 cents in May 1992 and to 44 cents in September 1995.
In addition to state and federal taxes, some of the stores are subject to county and local
excise taxes. Cook County, Illinois levies a separate excise tax on cigarettes. Cook County
increased the excise tax from 10 cents per pack at the beginning of the period to 18 cents in
March 1996. Additionally, two cities levy municipal excise taxes on cigarettes. The city of
Chicago had a 16 cent per pack excise tax, and the city of Evanston maintained a 10 cent per
pack excise tax. Twenty ﬁve of the stores in our sample were located outside of Cook County.
Thirty-eight were located within Cook County, but outside of Chicago or Evanston. Seventeen
were located within the Chicago city limits, and three were located within the Evanston city
limits.
Figure 1 displays the per-pack excise tax in four jurisdictions where DFF stores are located:
within-Chicago, within-Evanston, within Cook-county but outside of Chicago/Evanston, and
outside of Cook County. In addition, Figure 1 displays the per-pack excise tax in Indiana and
Wisconsin. In Figure 2, we graph the excise taxes in the four jurisdictions relative to excise
taxes in Wisconsin.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the data. For the mean store-week, four hundred
packs are sold. Approximately half of the cigarettes are sold the carton. The average price
for cigarettes is $2.32 per pack for all cigarettes, $2.09 per pack for all cigarettes sold by the
carton and $2.03 per pack for discount cigarettes. The mean cigarette excise tax (including
federal, state and local taxes) for stores in our sample is 73.8 cents per pack, or approximately
24 percent of the mean tax-inclusive price. Across all stores and over the entire time period,
customers could save on average 35.3 cents per pack by traveling to Indiana and 12.2 cents per
pack by traveling to Wisconsin.
In addition to sales, we observe the characteristics of each store. Using the reported latitude
and longitude for each store in the DFF dataset, we calculate the straight-line distance to
Indiana and Wisconsin. On average, the stores are 27.5 miles from the Indiana border and 42.9
7City ordinances can be found at the city websites or at http://www.amlegal.com and http://www.municode.com.
9miles from the Wisconsin border. The nearest stores are 2.0 miles from the Indiana border and
11.8 miles from the Wisconsin border. The DFF dataset also provides information about the
demographics of store customers. Across stores, median household income varies from a low
of approximately $19,300 for the store with the least-wealthy customers to a high of $73,100
for the store with the most-wealthy customers. Mean age, the fraction of minority customers,
the fraction with a 4-year college degree, and the fraction living below the poverty line vary
substantially as well.
4 Results
We apply two empirical approaches to the data described in the previous section in order to
distinguish the diﬀerent margins by which consumers adapt to tax changes. First, we examine
the discontinuous increase in the Illinois tax in July 1993. This large tax change allows us
to examine short-run consumer behavior; in particular, we test for evidence of stockpiling in
anticipation of the tax increase and examine whether stockpiling varies for diﬀerent classes of
cigarettes and with proximity to low-tax borders. We then extend this analysis to the entire
sample by constructing a panel from 1989 to 1996 of taxes, cigarette sales, and cigarette prices.
Using the panel, we estimate stockpiling as well as longer run methods of adaptation, such as
switching between more and less expensive cigarettes and border crossing.
4.1 Event Study
Our ﬁrst approach exploits the discontinuous change in the Illinois state taxes in July 1993.
The 46% increase in per-pack taxes represents the largest tax increase in our sample. Figure
3 graphs the sales of premium and discount cigarettes in the weeks immediately preceding and
following the tax change in June 1993 (week 200). The sales are normalized by the corresponding
quantities in week 171. As seen in the ﬁgure, suggestive evidence of stockpiling is present
for discount cigarettes. A large rise occurs in the sales of discount cigarettes in the weeks
immediately preceding the tax change. No such increase in premium brand sales can be seen.
Figure 4 graphs premium and discount sales for stores within 15 miles, between 15 and 30
miles, and more than 30 miles from the Indiana border. Cigarette sales are substantially lower
at stores close to the Indiana border where residents are located near a lower-tax jurisdiction.
The ﬁgure suggests that no surge in sales prior to the tax increase occurred in stores within 20
miles of the border. Further away from the Indiana border, stockpiling of discount cigarettes
emerges. Moreover, the percentage increase in discount sales is greatest for stores more than 20
10miles from the Indiana border where residents may have diﬃculty purchasing cigarettes from
lower-tax jurisdictions. No such pattern exists for premium cigarettes at these store locations.
To more formally investigate stockpiling, substitution from “premium” to “discount” cigarettes,
and cross-border substitution, we employ a simple event study regression to control for store-
speciﬁc factors that may account for these diﬀerences over time. We normalize sales so that
quantities for all categories of cigarettes (e.g., whether sold in packs or cartons) are measured
in packs. We estimate the following regression for the logarithm of the total number of packs
sold at store j in week t in a ten-month window surrounding the Illinois tax increase:
log(qjt) = β0 +
8 X
s=3
βsDs,t + β9Dplust + θj + ǫit (10)
where D is a monthly dummy, and store ﬁxed eﬀects θ control for unobservable time-invariant
diﬀerences in smoking preferences by store. For our ten-month window, we use the ﬁrst two
months as a baseline period when behavior was unlikely to be aﬀected by the future tax change,
and we include monthly dummies for each month thereafter (months 3 through 8). The variable
Dplus is a dummy for all months after month 8. The tax change occurs at the end of month
5 / start of month 6, so we interpret the coeﬃcients on the monthly dummies as changes
in consumption due to the tax change. For instance, if consumers do stockpile cigarettes in
anticipation of the tax increase, we would expect β3,β4 and β5 to be positive. Moreover, if
stockpiling increases close to the date of the tax change, we would expect β3,β4 and β5 to be
monotonically increasing.
Table 2 reports our OLS regression results over our ten-month window surrounding the July
1993 Illinois tax increase. We are interested in how sales evolve over this time frame relative to
the baseline period. Columns (1)-(3) report sales for all cigarettes and by brand (premium or
discount). Even controlling for store-speciﬁc factors, we ﬁnd suggestive evidence of stockpiling,
as the estimated coeﬃcients indicate that immediately preceding the tax increase, sales of total
cigarettes gradually increase by 6 percent three months prior to the tax increase, by 25 percent
two months before, and by 40 percent in the immediate month prior to the tax increase. Sales
also begin to decline after the tax increase with sales eventually 16 percent lower after the third
month.
To more closely examine the pattern of stockpiling and investigate whether it varies by
discount or premium cigarettes, we decompose cigarettes sales into the two categories of discount
and premium cigarettes, and we re-run the regression in equation (10). We ﬁnd that the large
increase in sales prior to the tax change occurred primarily from the increase in discount sales;
11no such surge occurred for the sales of premium cigarettes in the weeks preceding the tax change.
Consistent with the ﬁgure 3, we ﬁnd that even after controlling for store-speciﬁc factors, evidence
of stockpiling exists in anticipation of the tax increase. Moreover, after the tax increase, sales
for discount cigarettes gradually decrease. This could be due to lags in the reporting of the data
or to some switching from brand cigarettes initially.
To examine whether stockpiling and switching behavior diﬀers between stores that are lo-
cated near a lower-tax jurisdiction, we split our data into two samples: stores that are within
20 miles of Indiana (the nearest jurisdiction with substantially lower taxes) and stores that
are located further away.8 Table 3 reports the results of our regressions. As expected, greater
stockpiling of discount cigarettes occurs in stores located far from the Indiana border; consumers
located far from the border are more likely to accumulate cigarettes in anticipation of a tax in-
crease. Columns (1) and (2) show that sales in stores located far from borders increase in the
month prior to the tax change with no comparable increase in sales for stores located near the
border. Furthermore, Columns (5) and (6) indicate that the increase in stockpiling at stores far
from the Indiana border occurs primarily for the sales of discount cigarettes. This stockpiling
of discount cigarettes is more pronounced at stores located far from the Indiana border. Once
again, no evidence of stockpiling exists for premium cigarettes in any stores. After the tax in-
crease, sales of discount cigarettes fall more rapidly at stores located near borders, as consumers
switch to lower-cost alternatives nearby. Sales of discount cigarettes decrease more slowly at
stores far from the border. This suggests a short-run adaptation towards purchasing discount
cigarettes in the immediate aftermath of a tax increase, particularly when lower-tax alternatives
are not readily present.
This event study suggests that the smokers of premium and discount cigarettes respond
diﬀerently to an anticipated tax increase. This pattern persists even controlling for store ﬁxed
eﬀects. In the next section, we use these facts to motivate our panel analysis of the eﬀects of
various tax increases over a longer period and to more closely investigate the diﬀerent margins
of consumer response to tax changes.
4.2 Panel Regressions
We extend our event study analysis by constructing a longer panel that includes two federal tax
changes, the 1993 tax change in Illinois, and tax changes in Wisconsin and Cook County. We
8Although some smokers may travel to Wisconsin as well, the tax diﬀerential is substantially smaller. In fact,
prior to the July 1993 tax increase, the per-pack excise tax in Wisconsin was eight cents per pack higher than that
in Illinois. The per-pack excise tax in Indiana, on the other hand, was twelve cents lower prior to the tax change.
12exploit the tax changes as well as heterogeneity in store location and demographics to examine
both consumers’ short-run and longer-run responses to tax changes.
We estimate the following demand regression for store j, class k in week t:
log(qjkt) = α1log(pjkt) (11)
+β1(τj,t+4 − τj,t) + β2(τj,t+4 − τj,t) ∗ Discountk + β3(τj,t+4 − τj,t)Xjkt
+β4dtaxjt/distj + β5(dtaxjt/distj) ∗ Cartonk
+θjk + δ1kt + δ2kt
2 + δ3kt
3 + δ4kt
4 + ǫjkt.
where qjkt is total cigarette sales in class k at store j in week t, pjkt is the average tax-inclusive
per-pack price, and τ is the total federal, state and local excise tax per pack. We aggregate sales
of four classes of cigarettes (premium cartons, premium packs, discount cartons, and discount
packs). We include store*class ﬁxed eﬀects to control for time-invariant preferences for diﬀerent
cigarettes at diﬀerent stores and estimate a separate quartic time trend for each class. The
vector X contains demeaned store demographics, such as the fraction of the store’s clientele
with a 4-year college degree, over 60 years of age, and minority as well as median income. We
include the logarithm of price as an independent variable to capture changes in consumption
due to changes in prices, and we incorporate diﬀerences in excise taxes to the nearest low-tax
border to capture the incentive of consumers to cross-borders.
We use a similar identiﬁcation strategy to Hausman (1997) and Nevo (2001). Our identify-
ing assumption is that prices are a function of supply and demand conditions unique to each
supermarket, supply conditions common across all supermarkets, and the per-unit excise tax.
As instruments for price, we use the log of mean cigarette price at all other supermarkets as
well as the tax appropriate to the store’s location. After including store ﬁxed eﬀects, class ﬁxed
eﬀects and class-speciﬁc quartic time trends, the identifying assumption is that demand at a
given supermarket is uncorrelated with the average change in price at other supermarkets.
In our base speciﬁcation, we include the tax change (in cents per pack) over the following
month to capture stockpiling behavior. Our estimate of β1 captures the idiosyncratic change
in purchases within-four weeks of an anticipated increase in excise taxes. Motivated by ﬁgures
3 and 4, we interact the tax change over the subsequent month with an indicator variable for
discount cigarettes to test whether stockpiling of discount and premium cigarettes diﬀers. In
addition, we further interact this variable with a store’s proximity to Indiana, the lowest-tax
jurisdiction in our sample, to examine whether stockpiling diﬀers with border-proximity. Finally,
13we interact the tax change with the demographic characteristics of the store’s clientele.
We also include a measure of the strength of the incentive to travel to a lower-tax jurisdiction.
As a proxy, we calculate the diﬀerence in the tax at a particular store and the closest neighboring
state (dtaxjt) and divide it by the straight-line distance to that state’s border (distj).9 This
proxy incorporates the fact that the tax diﬀerential and border proximity work in opposite
directions. As the tax diﬀerential rises (e.g., tax in Cook county rises) or the distance to the
border falls, consumers will be more likely to border-cross, and we would expect cigarette sales
to fall. Since the incentive to travel to low-tax jurisdictions also depends on how many cigarettes
a smoker regularly consumes, we further interact our proxies for stockpiling with an indicator
variable for sales by the carton.
Table 4 presents the results of our regression. We estimate a cigarette price elasticity between
-0.35 to -0.40, falling within the range of estimates from the previous literature, ranging from
-0.14 to -1.23 (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000). In speciﬁcations (5) and (6), we interact price
with and indicator variable for discount cigarettes - the point estimate for discount cigarettes
is positive with a p-value of 0.106, suggesting that demand for discount cigarette may be less
elastic than demand for premium cigarettes.
We ﬁnd evidence of stockpiling prior to tax increases - in our base speciﬁcation, we estimate
that a one-cent increase in taxes is associated with 1.4 percent increase in sales for the four-
weeks prior to the tax change. Consistent with our results from the event study analysis of
the tax increase in July 1993, we ﬁnd that stockpiling is entirely driven by sales of discount
cigarettes. We estimate that a one cent increase in taxes is associated with approximately four
percent increase in sales of discount cigarettes one month prior to the tax change. Stockpiling
increases in magnitude with distance from Indiana - the nearest jurisdiction with substantially
lower taxes for many smokers.10 Across speciﬁcations (3) through (6), we estimate that in the
month before a ten-cent tax change, sales of discount cigarettes rise between 40 and 45 percent
at a store located at mean distance from the Indiana border (27.5 miles). Our results also
suggest that, even for discount cigarettes, very little stockpiling occurs within 8-10 miles of the
9We use a store’s closest neighboring state as the point of comparison. For all stores, the neighboring states of
Wisconsin and Indiana represent the greatest absolute tax savings. Consumers purchasing within Cook County (or
alternatively, within Chicago) may prefer to travel a shorter distance (e.g. just outside of the county or city but not
outside of Illinois) to avoid the county and city taxes, but not the state taxes. For these consumers, we also calculated
the location that represented the greatest tax savings per mile traveled and used that as the point of comparison for
an alternative measure of the border crossing incentive. This alternative measure is highly correlated (r=0.89) with
our more simple comparison to the closest neighboring state. Furthermore, the use of the alternative measure does
not substantially change our results.
10Although some smokers may travel to Wisconsin as well, the tax diﬀerential is substantially smaller. In fact,
prior to the July 1993 tax increase, the per-pack excise tax in Wisconsin was eight cents per pack higher than that
in Illinois. The per-pack excise tax in Indiana, on the other hand, was twelve cents lower prior to the tax change.
14Indiana border.
When we interact the tax change over the subsequent month with demographics, we ﬁnd
that stockpiling is negatively correlated with the proportion of minority customers, although
the eﬀect is quite modest. We estimate that a one-standard deviation in the proportion of non-
minority customers is associated with six percent higher sales in the month before a ten-cent tax
change. We do not ﬁnd that other demographics are signiﬁcantly correlated with stockpiling.
Furthermore, we do not ﬁnd that the inclusion of the demographic variables substantively aﬀects
the estimates of our other coeﬃcients.
We ﬁnd mixed evidence that consumers travel from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. In
our base regression, we estimate a negative, but imprecisely estimated coeﬃcient on our proxy
for the strength of the incentive to cross to a lower tax jurisdiction. Since the incentive to
border-cross is greater for heavy smokers than light smokers, and smoking intensity is likely
correlated with purchasing by the carton rather than the pack, we test whether carton-level
sales respond more to border proximity and tax diﬀerential than pack-level sales. When we
estimate the coeﬃcient on the interaction term, we ﬁnd that that the incentive to border cross
aﬀects sales by the carton exclusively. For a store ﬁve miles from the Indiana border, facing the
average Illinois - Indiana tax diﬀerential during the period (∼ 24 cents per pack), we estimate
that carton sales are approximately 44 percent lower than carton sales at store of mean distance
from the Indiana border. We do not ﬁnd a similar decline in sales of individual packs.
To examine substitution between premium and discount cigarettes, calculate the market
share of discount cigarettes at each store. We regress discount cigarette market share on a
similar set of variables to those in the previous regression, replacing the pack price with the
appropriate cigarette tax for the store measured in cents per pack. Again, we include store
ﬁxed eﬀects as well as a quartic time trend. The coeﬃcients on the excise tax and interactions
with demographics and distance capture long-run changes in market share after controlling for
the quartic time trend, and the coeﬃcients on the dummy variables for the immediate months
preceding and following the tax change reﬂect short-run changes in market share.
Our stylized theoretical model makes several predictions about tax-induced substitution
between quality-tiers. Absent addiction, we should expect consumers to shift from discount to
premium cigarettes following a tax increase - an increase in per-unit taxes reduces the relative
price diﬀerential between premium and discount cigarettes. Although consumer will stockpile,
they will stockpile whatever cigarettes they consumed in the pre-tax period. With addiction,
though, consumer may shift between diﬀerent quality-tiers to help smooth their adjustment to
15high cigarette taxes. If the disutility of reducing consumption is suﬃciently high, the model
predicts that even individuals who smoke premium cigarettes in the pre-tax period may stockpile
discount cigarettes and may shift consumption to discount cigarettes for a time following a tax
increase to help smooth the transition to higher taxes.
Our results in Table 5 are consistent with these predictions. Across all ﬁve speciﬁcations, we
ﬁnd that cigarette taxes are negatively correlated with the market share of discount cigarettes. A
ten cent increase in cigarette taxes is associated with a percentage point reduction in discount
cigarette market share. This eﬀect declines as the percent of a store’s customers that are
minority or over 60 years of age increases. These smokers may permanently substitute away
from premium brands in favor of cheaper discount cigarettes. In the short-run, though, we
ﬁnd evidence consistent with consumer addiction. In the month preceding a tax change, we
ﬁnd that consumers tend to stockpile discount cigarettes - a ten cent increase in cigarette taxes
is associated with a 4.5 percentage point increase in the market share of discount cigarettes.
This result is consistent with the substantial stockpiling of cigarettes observed in the event
study analysis and the panel regressions in Table 4. Furthermore, we also see a shift towards
discount cigarettes for a time following a tax change. In the immediate month following the tax
increase, the discount market share remains elevated - a ten cent tax increase is associated with
approximately a 2.4 percentage point increase in the discount market share.
These results conﬁrm the evidence from the event study in the previous section that con-
sumers do engage in border-crossing due to diﬀerential taxes across jurisdictions and do in fact
stockpile in anticipation of tax increases. The consumers most likely to travel are the heavy
smokers, who consume large quantities (cartons) of cigarettes. In the short-run, stockpiling
behavior varies by demographic with higher-educated areas stockpiling in anticipation of a tax
increase. Furthermore, we ﬁnd some evidence consistent with substitution from premium to
discount cigarettes in the month after the tax change, although over the longer-run the share of
discount cigarettes is negatively correlated with the tax increase. These results that consumers’
short- and long-run response to a tax increase vary for diﬀerent segments of the population,
depending on brand preferences, demographics and location.
4.3 Tax Incidence
Finally, we examine the incidence of cigarette excise taxes. The results in the previous section
suggest that smokers of premium and discount cigarettes and smokers located nearby and far
from borders respond very diﬀerently to tax increases. In addition, we found suggestive evidence
16that demand for discount brands was less elastic than demand for premium brands. We test to
see whether these heterogeneous responses translate into diﬀerences in excise tax pass-through.
For taxes motivated by non-ﬁscal considerations like “sin” taxes, incidence plays a clear role
in regulatory eﬃcacy. If the burden of taxes falls primarily on producers, the eﬀect of tax on
smoking intensity may be lessened.
As Poterba (1996) points out, there has been limited empirical work on the incidence of
cigarette excise taxes and consumer goods more generally. Keeler, et al. (1996) use aggregate
state-level data from 1960 to 1990 and ﬁnd that state taxes are more than passed on to con-
sumers. A one-cent tax increase is associated with a price increase of 1.11 cents. More recently,
Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) have examined the eﬀects of a gas tax moratorium on retail
gasoline prices and ﬁnd that short-run pass-through estimates are smaller near state borders.
Other studies have also analyzed pass-through in the retail market for gasoline and alcohol
(Chouinard and Perloﬀ (2004, 2007); Marion and Muehlegger (2010); Kenkel (2005) Alm, et al.
(2009)).
Our analysis contributes to this research in two important ways. First, we exploit our ability
to observe UPC-level prices to estimate pass-through for diﬀerent classes of cigarettes (premium
vs. discount cigarettes and sales by the carton or pack). To our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst
paper to estimate pass-through for diﬀerent classes of cigarettes and one of very few to examine
tax incidence at the product-level. Consequently, our estimates inform whether diﬀerential
rates of substitution across and between diﬀerent quality-tiers lead to meaningful diﬀerences
in tax incidence. Second, our analysis informs the growing literature empirically examining
tax incidence near jurisdictional boundaries. Similar to Doyle and Samphantharak (2008), we
empirically test whether greater demand elasticity near low-tax borders leads to a meaningful
reduction in pass-through rates. Our results from the previous section predict that this eﬀect
should vary for diﬀerent classes of cigarettes - border-proximity disproportionately aﬀects sales
of cigarettes sold by the carton, suggesting that heavy smokers of these cigarettes are more
willing to travel to avoid cigarette taxes. Consequently, we examine whether pass-through is
lower near low-tax borders, and is particularly low for premium cigarettes sold by the carton
for which border-crossing is greatest.
We estimate cigarette tax incidence in a straightforward fashion. We assume that the tax-
inclusive price for UPC u in category k and store j at time t is a function of the relevant excise
tax, the excise tax interacted with our proxy for the incentive to border-cross (the tax diﬀerential
to the neighboring state divided by the distance to the state), class-speciﬁc linear time trends
17and UPC-store ﬁxed eﬀects:
Tax Inclusive Priceujt = αuj +
X
k
βkExciseTaxjt (12)
+γ ∗ ExciseTaxjt ∗ (dtaxjt/distj)
+ηCartonu ∗ ExciseTaxjt ∗ (dtaxjt/distj)
+δk ∗ t + ǫujt.
Rather than estimate the equation in levels, we ﬁrst-diﬀerence all of the variables (dropping
the time-invariant UPC-store ﬁxed eﬀects) and estimate tax incidence oﬀ of retail price changes
contemporaneous with the tax increase. By ﬁrst-diﬀerencing, we do not misattribute the price
eﬀects of long-term shifts of supply and demand as changes in tax incidence. We consider four
cigarette classes (branded vs. discount, pack vs. carton) denoted by k and separately estimate
pass-through for each class of cigarette. Consequently, the equation we estimate is
∆Tax Inclusive Priceujt =
X
k
β∆ExciseTaxjt (13)
+γ∆ExciseTaxjt ∗ (dtaxjt/distj)
+ηCartonu ∗ ∆ExciseTaxjt ∗ (dtaxjt/distj)
+δk + νujt.
Table 6 presents our results. In column 1, we estimate a common pass-through coeﬃcient
for all cigarettes and estimate that consumers bear approximately 52 percent of cigarette excise
taxes. In column 2, we include interaction terms for carton sales and discount sales. Consistent
with our empirical results from the panel regressions, we ﬁnd that pass-through for cartons
is 21 percentage points lower than pass-through for cigarettes sold by the pack. Moreover,
we ﬁnd that pass-through for discount cigarettes is 6 percentage points higher than that for
premium cigarettes consistent with demand for discount cigarettes being more price-inelastic
than demand for premium cigarettes. In column 3, we separately estimate incidence for each
class of cigarettes and ﬁnd a similar pattern. Pass-through for products sold by the pack is
higher than pass-through for cartons and a greater fraction of cigarette taxes are borne by
smokers of discount cigarettes than premium cigarettes. Estimates of tax pass-through vary
from 39 percent for premium cigarettes sold by the carton to 64 percent for discount cigarettes
sold by the pack.
In column 4, we include two interaction terms to study whether proximity to low-tax borders
18is correlated with excise tax pass-through. The ﬁrst term interacts the excise tax with our proxy
for the incentive to border cross (the tax diﬀerential to the neighboring state divided by the
distance to the state). This term allows pass-through to vary for stores close-to and far-from
borders as well as over time as the excise tax-diﬀerentials between Illinois, Wisconsin and Indiana
change. Second, we include an additional interaction term speciﬁc to premium cigarettes sold
by the carton. This term allows us to test for an especially large reduction in pass-through for
the class of cigarettes for which we observe the most border crossing.
Our results are entirely consistent with our empirical ﬁndings of consumer behavior. We
estimate that tax pass-through falls as the incentive to cross to a low-tax jurisdiction increases
(either through rising tax diﬀerentials or increased proximity). This is consistent with incidence
theory if demand near low-tax jurisdictions is more tax elastic. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that
this eﬀect is especially strong for cigarettes sold by the carton, for which border-crossing is
greatest. At a store ﬁve miles from the Indiana border, our estimates suggest that pass-through
for cartons is approximately 11 percentage points lower than at a store in the interior of the
state. Pass-through for cigarettes sold by the pack is approximately 4 percentage points lower.
The diﬀerential eﬀect of border proximity accounts for approximately half of the variation in
pass-through between cigarettes sold by the carton and cigarettes sold by the pack.
Finally, the nature of our data allows us to consider one additional analysis. Discussions
of tax incidence often make an implicit assumption that pass-through is relatively uniform for
all brands of a particular good (such as cigarettes). In our particular context, we can estimate
pass-through rates speciﬁc to each UPC-store. We examine how much of the variation in UPC-
store level pass-through rates is explained by class- or UPC- dummy variables and ﬁnd that
much of the variation in pass-through rates occurs at the class-level.11 Between-class variation
accounts for approximately 44 percent of the variation in pass-through rates. Within-class but
between-UPC variation accounts for an additional 8 percent of the variation in pass-through
rates. The remainder is variation in within-UPC variation in pass-through rates at diﬀerent
stores. This suggests that much of the variation in pass-through rates can be captured by
relatively parsimonious product characteristics.
11For the analysis, we exclude UPCs appearing infrequently in the data. We limit our sample to UPCs appearing
in at least one-quarter of the stores in our sample and with positive sales for at least twenty-six weeks. As in the
analyses above, we include UPC-store ﬁxed eﬀects. We also include UPC-speciﬁc time trends.
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Consumers can adapt and respond to tax changes in various ways in the short- and long-run
that may undermine the intent of the tax. In this paper, we identify four diﬀerent margins by
which consumers may alter their behavior: (1) reducing consumption, (2) stockpiling prior to a
tax change, (3) substituting purchases away from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions,
and (4) substituting between high-price and low-price products.
Using a rich panel of cigarette sales at 85 locations of a Dominick’s Finer Foods in the
Chicago area, we apply two distinct empirical approaches to examine consumers’ response to
changes in cigarette excise taxes. Our ﬁrst approach exploits a discrete increase in Illinois’ state
cigarette tax that increased the per-pack excise tax approximately 46 percent in July 1993.
We apply an event study approach to examine consumers’ short-run response to tax changes.
Then we extend our analysis to exploit a long panel of state and local tax changes, as well as
heterogeneity in store location and demographics.
We estimate price elasticities of approximately -0.4, consistent with other estimates from the
literature. In addition, we ﬁnd evidence of all three types of cigarette tax avoidance: stockpiling,
border-crossing, and shifting from higher to lower-quality cigarettes. Interestingly, we ﬁnd
substantial variation in how smokers of diﬀerent cigarettes choose to avoid cigarette taxes.
We ﬁnd that stockpiling diﬀers markedly by quality-tier. For discount cigarettes, we ﬁnd
evidence of substantial stockpiling. In the month prior to a ten-cent tax increase, we estimate
that discount cigarette sales increase forty to forty-ﬁve percent. We do not ﬁnd evidence of
stockpiling for premium cigarettes.
We ﬁnd some evidence that consumers substitute between quality-tiers in the short-run in
response to tax changes. In the month after a tax increase, we ﬁnd that the market share
of discount cigarettes rises, consistent with consumers substituting to lower-cost cigarettes to
help smooth their reduction in consumption. Over the longer term, we ﬁnd that taxes are
positively correlated with premium cigarette market share, except at stores with relatively higher
proportion of minority customers or customers over age sixty. While most smokers who continue
to smoke absorb the additional taxes, customers at these stores appear to shift from premium
cigarettes to less expensive discount cigarettes to oﬀset the increase in taxes.
Finally, we ﬁnd that stores closer to lower-tax jurisdictions face greater reductions in sales
following tax increases. We estimate that the eﬀect is almost entirely driven by sales of premium
cartons and is consistent with heavy smokers traveling to nearby lower-tax jurisdictions to evade
higher in-state excise taxes. For the typical store, located 27.5 miles from the Indiana border,
20we estimate that a ten cent increase in the Illinois state tax is associated with a seven percent
reduction in carton sales. In contrast, we estimate that a similar tax increase is associated with
a thirty two percent reduction in carton sales for a store 5 miles from the Indiana border.
Importantly for policy, we ﬁnd that these diﬀerence in smoker response lead to meaningful
diﬀerences in excise tax incidence. Consistent with incidence theory, we ﬁnd that pass-through
increases for more price-inelastic brands and declines in situations where consumers can easily
avoid state, county and local cigarette taxes. We estimate that pass-through is greater for
discounted brands for which demand is more inelastic. In addition, we ﬁnd that pass-through
falls for all cigarettes near low-tax borders, but the eﬀect is most pronounced for cigarettes
sold by the carton, for which cross-border avoidance is greatest. We estimate that cross-border
avoidance causes pass-through to decline by approximately 11 percentage points for cartons
when sold near to low-tax borders.
Our results inform the public policy implications of tax increases, especially for “sin” taxes
with non-ﬁscal motives. For these taxes, consumer avoidance directly undermines policy objec-
tives. We ﬁnd that consumer behavior in anticipation and following a tax increase vary by the
intensity of consumption (heavy vs. light smokers), proximity to the border, and by demograph-
ics (such as age and race). In addition, our results have important implications for tax policy
evaluation. Our results suggest that short-run changes in smoking are likely to be misrepresen-
tative of long-run changes in behavior. In the short-run, stockpiling and substitution to low-cost
cigarettes allow consumers to partially mitigate the eﬀects of a tax increase. Furthermore, the
behavior of consumers close to jurisdictional boundaries are unlikely to be similar to the be-
havior of consumers who do not have access to lower-tax alternatives. Near these boundaries,
consumers can avoid tax increases. Finally “sin” taxes are passed less-fully onto consumers near
the borders of lower-tax jurisdictions, potentially limiting the impact on consumers who con-
tinue to purchase within the high-tax jurisdiction. Any tax intervention meant to either directly
or indirectly discourage consumption should take these consumer responses into account.
21References
[1] Adda, J., Cornaglia, F. (2006). “Taxes, Cigarette Consumption and Smoking Intensity,”
American Economic Review, 96, 1013-1028.
[2] Alm, J., Sennoga, E., Skidmore, M. (2009). “Perfect Competition, Urbanization, and Tax
Incidence in the Retail Gasoline Market,” Economic Inquiry, 47, 118-134.
[3] Baltagi, B.H., Goel, R.K. (2000). “Quasi-Experimental Price Elasticity of Liquor Demand
in the United States: 1960-83,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 72, 451-454.
[4] Baltagi, B.H., Griﬃn, J.M. (1995). “A Dynamic Demand Model for Liquor: The Case for
Pooling,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 77, 545-553.
[5] Beard, T., Gant, P., Saba, R. (1997). “Border-Crossing Sales, Tax Avoidance, and State
Tax Policies: An Application to Alcohol,” Southern Economic Journal, 64, 293-306.
[6] Chaloupka, F., Warner, K.E. (2000). “The Economics of Smoking,” Handbook of Health
Economics, Elsevier Science, North Holland.
[7] Chiou, L.. Muehlegger, E. (2008). “Crossing the Line: Direct Estimation of Cross-Border
Cigarette Sales and the Eﬀect on Tax Revenue,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis
and Policy (Contributions), 8, Article 48.
[8] Chouinard, H., Perloﬀ, J.M. (2004). “Incidence of Ferderal and State Gasoline Taxes,”
Economics Letters, 83, 55-60.
[9] Chouinard, H., Perloﬀ, J.M.(2007). “Gasoline Price Diﬀerences: Taxes, Pollution Regu-
lators, Mergers, Market Power, and Market Condition,” The B.E. Journal of Economic
Analysis and Policy, 7, Article 8.
[10] Coats, M. (1995). “A Note on Estimating Cross-Border Eﬀects of State Cigarette Taxes,”
National Tax Journal, 48, 573-584.
[11] Crawford, I., Tanner, S. (1995). “Bringing It All Back Home: Alcohol Taxation and Cross-
Border Shopping,” Fiscal Studies, 16, 94-114.
[12] DeCicca, P., Kenkel, D., Mathios, A., Shin, Y., Lim, Y. (2006). “Youth Smoking, Cigarette
Prices, and Anti-smoking Sentiment”, Health Economics, 17, 733-749.
[13] Doyle, J., Samphantharak, K. (2008). “$2.00 Gas! Studying the Eﬀects of a Gas Tax
Moratorium,” Journal of Public Economics, 92. 869-884.
[14] Ellison, G., Ellison, S.F. (2007). “Internet Retail Demand: Taxes, Geography, and Online-
Oﬄine Competition,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics,
working paper.
[15] Emery, S., White, M., Gilpin, E., Pierce, J. (2002). “Was There Signiﬁcant Tax Evasion
After the 1999 50 Cent Per Pack Cigarette Tax Increase in California,” Tobacco Control,
11, 130-134.
[16] Goolsbee, A. (2000). “In a World Without Borders: The Impact of Taxes on Internet
Commerce,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, no. 2, pp. 561-576.
[17] Goolsbee, A., Lovenheim, M.F., Slemrod, J. (2007). “Playing with Fire: Cigarettes, Taxes
and Competition from the Internet.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, forth-
coming.
[18] Gruber, J., Sen, A., Stabile, M. (2003). “Estimating Price Elasticities When There Is
Smuggling: The Sensitivity of Smoking to Price In Canada,” Journal of Health Economics,
22, 821-842.
[19] Hausman, J. (1997). “Valuation of New Goods Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition,”
ed. T. Bresnahan and R. Gordon, The Economics of New Goods, 1997.
22[20] Hyland, A., Bauer, J.E., Li, Q., Abrams, S.M., Higbee, C., Peppone, L., Cummings, K.M.
(2005). “Higher Cigarette Prices Inﬂuence Cigarette Purchase Patterns,” Tobacco Control,
14, 86-92.
[21] Keeler, T.E., Hu, T., Barnett, P.G., Manning, W.G., Sung, H. (1996). “Do Cigarette
Producers Price-discriminate by State? An Empirical Analysis of Local Cigarette Pricing
and Taxation,” Journal of Health Economics, 15, 499-512.
[22] Kenkel, D. (2005). “Are Alcohol Tax Hikes Fully Passed through to Prices? Evidence from
Alaska,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 95, 273-277.
[23] Lovenheim, M.F. (2008). “How Far to the Border?: The Extent and Impact of Cross-Border
Casual Cigarette Smuggling,” National Tax Journal, 61, 7-33.
[24] Manuszak, M., Moul, C. (2006). “How Far for a Buck? Tax Diﬀerences and the Location of
Retail Gasoline Activity in Southeast Chicagoland,” Review of Economics and Statistics,
forthcoming.
[25] Marion, J., Muehlegger, E. (2010). “Tax Incidence and Supply Conditions,” Harvard
Kennedy School working paper.
[26] Nevo, A. (2001). “Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry,” Econo-
metrica, 69, 307-342.
[27] Poterba, J.M. (1996). “Retail Price Reactions to Changes in State and Local Sales Taxes,”
National Tax Journal, 49, 165-176.
[28] Stehr, M. (2005). “Cigarette Tax Avoidance and Evasion,” Journal of Health Economics,
24, 277-297.
[29] Stehr, M. (2007). “The Eﬀect of Sunday Sales Bans and Excise Taxes on Drinking and
Cross Border Shopping for Alcoholic Beverages,” National Tax Journal, 60, 85-105.
[30] Sung, H., Hu, T., Keeler, T. (1994). “Cigarette Taxation and Demand: An Empirical
Model,” Contemporary Economic Policy, 12, 91-100.
[31] The Tax Burden on Tobacco Historical Compilation (2007), 42, electronic.
[32] Thursby, J., Thursby, M. (2000). “Interstate Cigarette Bootlegging: Extent, Revenue
Losses, and Eﬀects of Federal Intervention,” National Tax Journal, 53 (1), 59-77.
[33] Yurekli, A., Zhang, P. (2000), “The Impact of Clean Indoor Air Laws and Cigarette Smug-
gling on Demand for Cigarettes: An Empirical Model,” Health Economics, 9, 159-170.
23Figure 1: Cigarette Excise Tax (cents/pack)
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
0 100 200 300 400
Week #
Chicago Evanston
Cook County Outside Cook County
Indiana Wisconsin
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25Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev Min Max Observations
Packs Sold 393.4 294.5 1 1917 24221
Packs Sold by the Carton 191.0 184.0 0 1440 24221
Discount Packs Sold 17.5 28.2 0 571 24221
Price Per Pack ($/pack) 2.32 0.23 1.72 4.21 24221
Price Per Pack - Sales by the Carton ($/pack) 2.09 0.14 1.67 2.57 22372
Price Per Pack - Discount Sales ($/pack) 2.03 0.25 1.30 6.81 18497
Per Pack Excise Tax (cpp) 73.8 13.5 50 102 24221
Excise Tax Relative to Indiana (cpp) 35.3 12.6 14.5 62.5 24221
Excise Tax Relative to Wisconsin (cpp) 12.2 11.4 -8 34 24221
Distance to IN (miles) 27.6 11.2 2.02 56.6 24221
Distance to WI (miles) 42.7 11.9 20.2 71.2 24221
Log(Median Household Income) 10.6 0.28 9.87 11.2 23414
Percent of Customers Below Poverty Line 0.056 0.043 0.014 0.21 23414
Percent of Customers College-educated 0.23 0.11 0.050 0.53 23414
Percent of Customers Over Age 60 0.17 0.062 0.058 0.31 23414
Percent of Minority Customers 0.15 0.17 0.024 1.00 23414
Note: Summary statistics based on UPC-level data aggregated to the store*week level.
Prices for carton and discount cigarettes are conditional on positive sales.
26Table 2: The Eﬀect of the June 1993 Illinois Tax Increase
(1) (2) (3)
total premium discount
month 3 0.0604* 0.0356 0.0821
(0.0322) (0.0234) (0.0553)
month 4 0.250*** -0.0227 0.800***
(0.0513) (0.0209) (0.0879)
month 5 (tax increase) 0.394*** -0.0321 1.223***
(0.0626) (0.0311) (0.0983)
month 6 0.168*** 0.00653 0.609***
(0.0582) (0.0441) (0.101)
month 7 -0.0283 0.000182 0.152
(0.0544) (0.0378) (0.0917)
month 8 -0.0481 0.0901 -0.110
(0.0547) (0.0572) (0.0900)
months 9 and 10 -0.165*** 0.0636 -0.354***
(0.0590) (0.0609) (0.0922)
Observations 6165 3363 2802
The dependent variable is the log of sales over a ten-month
window surrounding the June 1993 increase in the Illinois
excise tax. The tax increase occurred at the end of month
5. The baseline period is months 1 and 2, three months
prior to the tax increase when we expect no behavioral
change in response to the future tax. All speciﬁcations in-
clude store ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust Standard Errors clustered
at the store level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
27Table 3: The Eﬀect of the June 1993 Illinois Tax Change on Total, Premium and Discount Sales,
by location
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
near far premium: near premium: far discount: near discount: far
month 3 0.125 0.0454 0.0379 0.0349 0.0546 0.0914
(0.0767) (0.0357) (0.0694) (0.0229) (0.127) (0.0623)
month 4 0.102 0.287*** -0.0720 -0.00828 0.529*** 0.859***
(0.108) (0.0577) (0.0607) (0.0202) (0.153) (0.100)
month 5 (tax increase) 0.142 0.457*** -0.00922 -0.0382 0.642*** 1.345***
(0.135) (0.0685) (0.0632) (0.0360) (0.222) (0.104)
month 6 -0.0474 0.223*** 0.0227 0.00237 0.0130 0.735***
(0.110) (0.0658) (0.139) (0.0417) (0.151) (0.112)
month 7 -0.186 0.0146 0.0329 -0.00878 -0.0228 0.188*
(0.143) (0.0566) (0.118) (0.0358) (0.187) (0.104)
month 8 -0.00740 -0.0592 0.301* 0.0291 -0.329* -0.0626
(0.112) (0.0628) (0.158) (0.0569) (0.170) (0.102)
months 9 and 10 -0.0169 -0.203*** 0.285 0.00154 -0.286 -0.371***
(0.148) (0.0639) (0.172) (0.0602) (0.190) (0.104)
Observations 1254 4911 747 2616 507 2295
The sample is split for premium and discount cigarettes as well as for stores located near (within 20 miles) and
far from Indiana (the nearest jurisdiction with substantially lower taxes. The dependent variable is the log of
sales over a ten-month window surrounding the June 1993 increase in the Illinois excise tax. The tax increase
occurred at the end of month 5. The baseline period is months 1 and 2, three months prior to the tax increase
when we expect no behavioral change in response to the future tax. All speciﬁcations include store ﬁxed eﬀects.
Robust Standard Errors clustered at the store level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
28Table 4: Consumer Response to Excise Tax Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Tax-Inclusive Price) -0.404** -0.355** -0.355** -0.354** -0.596*** -0.625***
(0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.162) (0.146) (0.149)
Discount*log(Tax-Inclusive Price) 0.376 0.426
(0.248) (0.260)
Tax diﬀerence/distance to nearest state -0.0174 0.00927 0.00555 0.00622 0.00450 0.00507
(0.0541) (0.0500) (0.0497) (0.0501) (0.0494) (0.0498)
Carton*(Tax diﬀerence/distance to nearest state) -0.0931** -0.0899* -0.0927* -0.0896* -0.0923*
(0.0464) (0.0462) (0.0472) (0.0460) (0.0470)
Tax Change Over Subsequent Month 0.0142*** -0.00426* -0.00432* -0.00371 -0.00418* -0.00356
(0.00302) (0.00233) (0.00232) (0.00230) (0.00230) (0.00228)
Discount*Subsequent Tax Change 0.0409*** -0.0122 -0.00143 -0.0122 -0.00151
(0.00420) (0.00873) (0.00897) (0.00873) (0.00897)
Discount*Subsequent Tax Change*Distance to IN 0.00186*** 0.00148*** 0.00186*** 0.00148***
(0.000290) (0.000298) (0.000291) (0.000298)
Subsequent Tax Change*4-year college fraction -0.000172 0.000381
(0.0226) (0.0226)
Subsequent Tax Change*Log(Median Income) -0.00301 -0.00326
(0.0127) (0.0126)
Subsequent Tax Change*Fraction Over 60 -0.0385 -0.0378
(0.0302) (0.0302)
Subsequent Tax Change*Minority Fraction -0.0352* -0.0352*
(0.0209) (0.0208)
Observations 71259 71259 71259 68053 71259 68053
R-Squared 0.859 0.859 0.860 0.856 0.860 0.856
The dependent variable is the log of sales. All speciﬁcations include a quartic time trend, store ﬁxed eﬀects and
carton*discount ﬁxed eﬀects. Taxes and average prices at other stores are used as instruments for price in the IV
speciﬁcations. For speciﬁcations (5) and (6), we further interact excise tax and average prices with the discount
indicator as instruments for the discount*log(Price) interaction term. Robust Standard Errors clustered at the
store level. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
2
9Table 5: Discount Cigarette Market Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tax Per Pack -0.000757*** -0.000480** -0.000956*** -0.000851*** -0.000694***
(0.000210) (0.000220) (0.000215) (0.000211) (0.000216)
Tax Change Over Subsequent Month 0.00456*** 0.00448***
(0.000383) (0.000392)
Tax Change Over Preceding Month 0.00241*** 0.00248***
(0.000288) (0.000297)
Tax diﬀerence/Distance to nearest state 0.00312*** 0.00186*
(0.00110) (0.00105)
Tax Per Pack * log(Median Income) 0.000593 0.000511
(0.000717) (0.000702)
Tax Per Pack * Perc. of Customers with BA 0.00150 0.00177
(0.00127) (0.00133)
Tax Per Pack * Perc. Minority Customers 0.00310** 0.00278**
(0.00137) (0.00135)
Tax Per Pack * Perc. of Customers Over 60 0.00635** 0.00562**
(0.00254) (0.00254)
Observations 24221 23538 24221 23414 22755
R-Squared 0.356 0.404 0.358 0.366 0.412
Robust Standard Errors clustered at the store level. The dependent variable is the sales of discount cigarettes divided by
total sales of all cigarettes. All speciﬁcations include store ﬁxed eﬀects and a quartic time trend. *, **, and *** denote
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
3
0Table 6: Cigarette Excise Tax Incidence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Cigarette Excise Tax (cpp) 0.525*** 0.605***
(0.0149) (0.0179)
∆ Tax * Carton -0.212***
(0.0251)
∆ Tax * Discount 0.0606*
(0.0363)
Premium Packs * ∆ Tax 0.610*** 0.653***
(0.0182) (0.0193)
Premium Cartons * ∆ Tax 0.387*** 0.478***
(0.0195) (0.0218)
Discount Packs * ∆ Tax 0.640*** 0.676***
(0.0383) (0.0392)
Discount Cartons * ∆ Tax 0.504*** 0.573***
(0.0636) (0.0618)
∆ Tax * (Tax Diﬀ / Dist to Border) -0.00828***
(0.00128)
Carton * -0.0129***
∆ Tax * (Tax Diﬀ / Dist to Border) (0.00317)
Observations 1119216 1119216 1119216 1119216
R-Squared 0.0357 0.0371 0.0372 0.0379
The dependent variable is the ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the tax-inclusive price. All indepen-
dent variables are ﬁrst-diﬀerenced. All speciﬁcations include class-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
Robust Standard Errors clustered at the UPC level. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance
Rat the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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